
The Securities and Exchange Board of India has proposed the sharpest limits yet on how long the people who run India's market infrastructure can stay in charge. The "Consultation Paper on Strengthening the Governance of Market Infrastructure Institutions (MIIs)", issued on Friday, 20 November 2026, would cap a managing director at 12 years across all stock exchanges, clearing corporations and depositories combined — down from a system that today lets one person lead one institution for 10 years and then move to another for a further 10, with no overall ceiling. Comments are open until Friday, 11 December 2026.
Quick answer: SEBI's consultation paper dated 20 November 2026 proposes capping managing directors of market infrastructure institutions at 12 years across all MIIs, cutting public interest directors' maximum age from 75 to 70 with a two-term limit, and giving AMFI's chief executive an ex officio board seat at AMC Repo Clearing Ltd. Comments close 11 December 2026.
In plain business language, this paper is about who guards the guardians. Stock exchanges, clearing corporations and depositories are the plumbing of the capital market — they are also first-line regulators, which is why their boards are built differently from company boards, with public interest directors (PIDs) whose job is to put the public interest ahead of commercial considerations. SEBI's argument is that long tenures concentrate too much knowledge, too many relationships and too much decision-making in too few hands, and that a narrow pool of the same people keeps circulating between institutions. The paper proposes hard ceilings on tenure for managing directors, executive directors and PIDs, plus a seat for the mutual fund industry on the board of the repo clearing corporation it funds.
The five proposals at a glance
Proposal 1 — Public interest directors: age 70, two terms
A public interest director is not an ordinary non-executive director. SEBI describes the role as quasi-regulatory: PIDs meet separately from other directors, lead and sit on several statutory committees, go through structured performance reviews and report conflicts. The paper says the role is more demanding than an ordinary non-executive directorship, and that the market has changed around it — faster, more technology-intensive and more interconnected, with cyber and operational risk and investor protection now central to the job.
Today a PID may be appointed up to the age of 75, for a term of 3 years, extendable by a further term of 3 years in the same MII or a third tenure of 3 years in another MII — three terms of 3 years each across MIIs. SEBI proposes a maximum age of 70 years and a total limit of two terms of 3 years each across MIIs: one tenure of 3 years, and a second tenure of 3 years on reappointment in the same MII or appointment in another MII.
The stated reasons are renewal and independence. A lower age and a shorter total tenure, SEBI says, supports a PID cohort whose experience and skills remain current, stops a narrow pool of the same people from recycling between institutions, opens the position to a wider and more diverse set of professionals, and strengthens board independence.
Proposal 2 — MDs and EDs: hard ceilings across the whole ecosystem
This is the centrepiece of the paper, and it works in two parts — managing directors first, executive directors second.
Managing directors. Today an MD serves up to 5 years a term, with a second term treated like a fresh appointment, so up to 10 years in one MII — and then a similar 10 years in another MII, with no limit on the total period across MIIs. The maximum age is 65 years. SEBI proposes: a single term of not more than 5 years; a maximum of 2 terms and 8 years in a single MII; and a maximum of 3 terms and 12 years across MIIs. For an individual already serving as an MD when the amendment takes effect, the overall period as an MD across MIIs would not exceed 15 years, to provide for a smooth transition. A PID, MD or ED holding office would continue until the end of the ongoing term.
SEBI gives four reasons. First, key-man risk and entrenchment: the MD is the most influential executive, and a long tenure concentrates knowledge, relationships and decision-making in one person. Second, influence across the ecosystem: at present a person can lead one MII for 10 years and then another for a further 10 years, and so on — and because MIIs are interconnected through clearing, settlement, depository and market-data linkages, one individual heading several of them in succession can carry a disproportionate influence over the whole ecosystem. A total ceiling of 12 years keeps that influence within a defined limit. Third, the first-line regulatory nature of the job: the head of an MII should hold office for a period that preserves objectivity and the ability to take unpopular decisions, not an open-ended association. Fourth, regular leadership renewal brings scope for evolution and new ideas.
Executive directors. Today the term and tenure of EDs are aligned with those of MDs, with no separate caps. SEBI proposes a single ED term of not more than 5 years; as an ED, an aggregate of not more than 8 years in a single MII and not more than 16 years across MIIs; and as ED and MD taken together, an aggregate of not more than 20 years across MIIs, subject to a maximum of 12 years (as ED and MD together) in a single MII.
The reasoning here is about the succession pipeline. SEBI says the ED route must not become a standing channel — ED to MD, MII to MII — for very long periods. The caps are meant to give a predictable leadership pipeline, let MIIs groom successors and time transitions without sudden gaps, and still allow a career path to the top: 8 years as an ED in a single MII, with a combined ceiling of 12 years as ED and MD, allows that path within known bounds. The outer limit of 20 years across MIIs ensures the total period holding executive directorships across the ecosystem is finite and predictable.
One thing the paper does not change: the MD maximum age of 65 years stays as it is. The proposed framework changes only term and tenure.
Proposal 3 — PIDs cannot sit on the boards of MII associates either
Under Regulation 24(4) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) (Stock Exchanges and Clearing Corporations) Regulations, 2018 (SECC Regulations) and Regulation 25(4) of the SEBI (Depositories and Participants) Regulations, 2018 (D&P Regulations), a PID must not hold a simultaneous directorship on the board of a subsidiary of the MII, any other MII, or a subsidiary of any other MII. SEBI proposes extending the restriction to associates of all MIIs.
The gap, as the paper puts it, is that an associate is an entity which holds significant control or voting power over an MII — a connected entity in substance. Without the extension, a PID could be placed on the board of an entity closely connected with an MII and thereby influence, or be influenced in, ways the restriction was meant to prevent. Extending it protects the PID's oversight role and the independence of the board.
Proposal 4 — A PID may sit on at most 4 statutory committees
An MII has 6 statutory committees in total under the SECC Regulations. Today a PID may be a member of at most 5 committees, but it is not clear whether the cap of 5 covers all committees or only statutory committees. SEBI proposes a clear rule: a PID may be a member of not more than 4 statutory committees.
The paper gives three reasons: the limit is now expressly for statutory committees, so the ambiguity goes; it spreads the oversight workload across PIDs rather than concentrating it on a few; and it allows each PID to give adequate attention to every committee on which they sit.
Proposal 5 — AMFI's chief executive gets a board seat at the repo clearing corporation
The fifth proposal is the most detailed in the paper, and it concerns AMC Repo Clearing Ltd (ARCL), the recognised limited purpose clearing corporation (LPCC) for repo transactions in corporate bonds.
The background runs back to 2020. SEBI's board, at its meeting on 29 September 2020, approved setting up an LPCC for repo transactions in corporate bonds. Mutual funds are the major lenders in that market, and the Association of Mutual Funds in India (AMFI) proposed that asset management companies be represented on the LPCC board through AMFI. But under Regulation 23(6) and (7) of the SECC Regulations, the governing board of an LPCC must not have a representative of any shareholder other than a public sector issuer, and no person who is a shareholder or an employee of a shareholder may be a director — so AMCs and AMFI currently have no representation.
ARCL is operational and growing fast. Tri-party repo cleared on ARCL rose from ₹33,778 crore in FY 2023-24, its first year, to ₹8.19 lakh crore in the first half of FY 2026-27 alone. Average daily value rose from ₹211 crore to ₹6,656.79 crore over the same period. In August 2026, mutual funds accounted for 98.49% of lending value and 97.38% of lending trades on ARCL, and repo rates on ARCL were observed 15 to 25 basis points higher than corresponding TREPS rates, benefiting investors in debt schemes.
The capital problem is the other side of the story. As on 30 June 2026, ARCL's net worth was ₹138.98 crore, against the minimum net worth requirement of ₹300 crore prescribed by RBI for an LPCC. No other market participant has shown concrete interest in significant capital contribution, because investment in ARCL carried no dividend and no exit until early 2027, and its shares are not listable. AMCs are expected to contribute again — the capital of ARCL is held by 37 AMCs — yet there is no provision for AMCs as a body to be represented. AMFI wrote to SEBI on 29 September 2025 proposing representation, and SEBI sought information by letter dated 16 October 2025. Urgency has increased as the compliance timeline nears and ARCL needs capital for its own clearing and settlement system to address RBI's outsourcing concerns.
SEBI proposes that the chief executive of AMFI, ex officio, may be appointed on the governing board of a recognised LPCC, notwithstanding the restrictions in Regulation 23(6) and (7) of the SECC Regulations. The appointment would be subject to conditions specified by SEBI, including conditions relating to contribution by AMCs to the share capital of the LPCC. The chief executive so appointed would be deemed a nominee director and treated as a non-independent director, and the requirement that PIDs must not be fewer than the number of non-independent directors would continue to apply. Appointment would need SEBI's prior approval under Regulation 24(1) of the SECC Regulations and would be subject to fit and proper criteria; the director would cease to hold office on the LPCC board upon ceasing to be chief executive of AMFI.
The safeguards, to be set out by circular, are specific. The AMFI chief executive as a non-independent director would not be a member of the Risk Management Committee, the Members Committee or the Regulatory Oversight Committee of the LPCC; would recuse from decisions of the governing board relating to risk management parameters, the Core Settlement Guarantee Fund, default management and matters relating to specific participants; and would not have access to data relating to individual participants.
SEBI's reasoning for routing the seat through AMFI rather than individual AMCs is practical. Individual representation of 37 AMCs would be impracticable or would favour larger AMCs; AMFI, a non-profit body representing all AMCs, provides a collective voice. Representation through the chief executive — a full-time professional, not an employee of any AMC, unlike AMFI's chairperson or vice-chairperson, who are serving AMC heads whose funds are ARCL participants — avoids conflict at the individual-AMC level and provides continuity, since the seat attaches to the office. Linking the seat to further capital contribution aligns owners' voice with capital commitment and incentivises the capital infusion ARCL needs.
SEBI also notes that governance at ARCL has been strengthened since 2020: functions are segregated into three verticals under Part C of Schedule II of the SECC Regulations — critical operations; regulatory, compliance, risk management and investor grievance functions; and other functions including business development — with the first two headed by executive directors who are key management personnel without revenue-oriented objectives. Together with three lines of defence (operations, risk management and compliance, and internal audit), statutory committees and PID performance review, SEBI says one non-independent director representing owners is adequately counterbalanced.
What the paper asks — the nine consultation questions
SEBI asks nine questions. In substance: whether the PID age limit should fall from 75 to 70 and the PID term limit from three terms to two; whether the MD term and tenure limits (single term up to 5 years; 8 years in a single MII; 12 years across MIIs) are appropriate; whether the ED limits (8 and 16 years as ED; 12 and 20 years as ED and MD together) are appropriate; whether the tenure limits for MDs, EDs and PIDs may be relaxed for those already appointed or for their current term; whether the PID simultaneous-directorship restriction should extend to associates of MIIs; whether the PID statutory-committee cap should be 4; whether the AMFI chief executive should be permitted on the LPCC board subject to conditions including capital contribution by AMCs; whether the proposed safeguards are adequate, and if not, what modifications or additional safeguards are needed; and any other comments on the detailed provisions.
What does not change
- The MD age cap of 65 years stays. The paper changes only term and tenure for MDs.
- People already in office finish their current term. A PID, MD or ED holding office continues until the end of the ongoing term; sitting MDs get the higher 15-year cumulative cap.
- Nothing is law yet. This is a consultation paper, not a circular or a regulation amendment. The proposals would be implemented through amendments to the SECC Regulations, 2018 and the D&P Regulations, 2018 only after SEBI considers the comments.
- The PID floor on boards stays. The requirement that public interest directors must not be fewer than the number of non-independent directors continues to apply, including after the AMFI nominee joins the LPCC board.
Who is affected
- Current and future MDs and EDs of MIIs — the 12-year and 20-year ecosystem-wide ceilings are the first of their kind. Anyone planning a career across exchanges, clearing corporations and depositories now has a finite horizon.
- Public interest directors — a lower age ceiling, a shorter total tenure, tighter directorship rules and fewer committee seats change who can serve and for how long.
- Stock exchanges, clearing corporations and depositories — boards must plan succession against fixed clocks, and the pool of eligible PIDs widens as the old pool rotates out.
- Mutual funds and AMCs — the AMFI seat gives the industry that funds ARCL a voice on its board, tied to further capital contributions, while keeping the chief executive out of risk and participant decisions.
- ARCL itself — the proposal is explicitly linked to the capital it needs to reach the ₹300 crore net worth requirement and to build its own clearing and settlement system.
- Law firms, governance advisers and industry bodies — the nine consultation questions invite reasoned responses by 11 December 2026; this is the window to shape the final rules.
What to do next
- If you have a view, comment by Friday, 11 December 2026. Submit through SEBI's public comments portal (link in Sources below). The paper asks nine questions — answer the ones that matter to you, with reasons. A short, reasoned response is enough.
- Use the email route only if the portal fails. If there is a technical issue with the web form, comments may be emailed to [email protected] and [email protected] with the subject "Strengthening the Governance of Market Infrastructure Institutions (MIIs)".
- Do not confuse this paper with SEBI's September paper. The 9 September 2026 consultation paper on the same theme proposed different things — a review of director-eligibility restrictions and qualification standards for key management personnel — and its comment window closed on 30 September 2026. This November paper is a separate tranche on tenure and age, not an amendment to the September proposals. Our article on the September paper is linked in Sources.
- Watch for the final rules after 11 December 2026. SEBI will consider comments and then decide. If it proceeds, expect amendments to the SECC Regulations, 2018 and the D&P Regulations, 2018 — and check whether sitting MDs' 15-year transitional cap survives in the final text.
- Do not treat the 12-year cap as already in force. Until a final amendment is notified, the current position stands: up to 10 years in one MII and a similar period in another, with no overall cap.
Common mistakes to avoid: (1) Treating a consultation paper as a rule change — nothing changes until SEBI amends the regulations. (2) Saying the MD age limit is being cut — the 65-year age cap is unchanged; only tenure is capped. (3) Reading the 12-year cap as per-institution — it is 12 years across all MIIs combined, with 8 years in any single one. (4) Confusing this with the September paper — different proposals, different comment window. (5) Assuming AMFI gets a risk-committee role — the chief executive is expressly kept off the Risk Management, Members and Regulatory Oversight Committees. (6) Missing the deadline — comments close on 11 December 2026.
Frequently asked questions
What is SEBI proposing for MII managing directors?
SEBI's consultation paper dated 20 November 2026 proposes capping a managing director at 12 years across all market infrastructure institutions, with a maximum of 8 years in any single MII and a single term of up to 5 years. Today an MD can serve up to 10 years in one MII and then a similar period in another, with no overall cap. Sitting MDs would get a higher cumulative cap of 15 years.
What changes for public interest directors?
The maximum age for appointment would fall from 75 to 70 years, and the total tenure from three terms of 3 years each to two terms of 3 years each across MIIs. The ban on simultaneous directorships would extend to associates of MIIs, and a PID could sit on at most 4 statutory committees, down from 5.
What is a market infrastructure institution (MII)?
A market infrastructure institution is a recognised stock exchange, a recognised clearing corporation (including a limited purpose clearing corporation) or a depository. MIIs perform a first-line regulatory role in the capital market, which is why their governance rules — public interest directors, tenure limits and statutory committees — are stricter than those for ordinary companies.
Does the paper change the MD retirement age of 65?
No. The maximum age of 65 years for managing directors is unchanged. The paper proposes limits only on term and tenure — how long an MD can serve, not the age at which they must stop.
What is ARCL and why does AMFI want a board seat there?
AMC Repo Clearing Ltd (ARCL) is the recognised limited purpose clearing corporation for repo transactions in corporate bonds. Mutual funds are the major lenders in that market — 98.49% of lending value in August 2026 — and 37 AMCs hold ARCL's capital, but current rules bar any shareholder representative other than a public sector issuer from its board. SEBI proposes letting AMFI's chief executive join ex officio, linked to further capital contributions by AMCs, with safeguards keeping the role away from risk and participant decisions.
How do I submit comments on the SEBI MII governance consultation paper?
Comments may be submitted by Friday, 11 December 2026 through SEBI's public comments portal at sebi.gov.in (link in Sources below). If there is a technical issue with the web form, comments may be emailed to [email protected] and [email protected] with the subject "Strengthening the Governance of Market Infrastructure Institutions (MIIs)".
Is this the same as SEBI's September 2026 MII governance paper?
No. The 9 September 2026 paper proposed a review of director-eligibility restrictions and qualification standards for key management personnel such as the chief technology officer and chief information security officer, and its comment window closed on 30 September 2026. The 20 November 2026 paper is a separate tranche covering tenure and age caps for MDs, EDs and PIDs, plus the AMFI board seat at ARCL.
When will the new tenure caps take effect?
There is no effective date yet. This is a consultation paper, and the proposals would take effect only after SEBI considers comments and notifies amendments to the SECC Regulations, 2018 and the D&P Regulations, 2018. People already in office would finish their ongoing term.
Sources
- SEBI — Consultation Paper on Strengthening the Governance of Market Infrastructure Institutions (MIIs), 20 November 2026 (official sebi.gov.in PDF, 14 pages)
- SEBI — Consultation paper detail page, Reports for Public Comments (official sebi.gov.in)
- SEBI — Public comments portal (official sebi.gov.in)
- CorpLawUpdates — SEBI Consultation Paper on Strengthening Governance of MIIs: Board Director Eligibility and KMP Qualification Framework (9 September 2026)
- CorpLawUpdates — SEBI Consultation Paper: Auto-Approval Route for MII Investments (22 October 2026)
- CorpLawUpdates — SEBI FPI Additional Disclosure Framework: SEBI Proposes to Scrap It — Comments Due 11 December 2026 (20 November 2026)
This article explains a regulatory proposal for general information. It is not legal or investment advice for any specific institution or individual — a consultation paper proposes a change; it does not make it. Confirm the treatment of your own position with your adviser, and check SEBI's website for the final decision after comments close.


